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Abstract
We develop a theoretical model of foreign aid to analyze a method of disbursement of aid
which induces the recipient government to follow a more pro-poor policy than it otherwise
would do. In our two-period model, aid is given in the second period and the volume of it
depends on the level of wellbeing of the target group in the first period. We find that this
way of designing aid does increase the welfare of the poor. We also consider the situations
where the donor and the recipient governments act simultaneously as well as sequentially,
and find that by moving first in a sequential game, the donor country can, under certain
conditions, increase the welfare of the poor and its own compared to the case of simultaneous
moves.
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Introduction

The basic purpose of foreign aid is to assist countries in promoting economic development
including improving the wellbeing of the poor. Although foreign aid in the form of Marshall
Aid after World War II was hugely successful in promoting economic development in the
war-torn Europe, its effect in the developing world in the last forty years or so has been
questionable (see, for example, Mosley et al. (1987), Boon (1996)). In the literature there
are many explanations for the latter, i.e., the ineffectiveness of aid. For example, it has
been said that aid promotes rent seeking behavior in the recipient countries (Svensson, 2000;
Alesina and Weder, 2002; Easterly, 2003). Burnside and Dollar (2000) and Collier and Dollar
(2002) suggested that aid is effective only in countries with good policies implying that the
ineffectiveness of aid is primarily due to bad policies followed by the recipient governments.1
In Dalgaard et al. (2004) geography seems to matter in the effectiveness of aid. Mavrotas
(2005) considers aid heterogeneity and finds variations in aid effectiveness according to the
type of aid.2
Conditional aid can in principle discipline the recipient government, and conditionality
can include policy changes. Adam and O’Connell (1999) and Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller
(1997a) examine the effects of aid that is tied to the reduction of distortionary taxes. Lahiri
and Raimondos-Møller (1997) and Svensson (2003) suggest that conditional or unconditional
aid can be made more effective if recipient countries compete for aid.
One of the problems however is that donors seem to have very little control on how the
recipients use aid. There are many empirical studies which suggest that for all intents and
purpose foreign aid is fungible: see , for example, Pack and Pack (1993), Khilji and Zampelli,
(1994), Boone (1996), Feyzioglu et al. (1998), and Swaroop (2000). Thus, conditionalities
are unlikely to work. In fact, many donor countries and institutions have tried giving aid
1

Hansen and Tarp (2001) and Easterly (2003) show that the Burnside-Collier-Dollar results are very
sensitive to model specifications and sample selection. Hansen and Tarp (2001) also find that aid is effective
without any qualification.
2
See also various articles in Lahiri (2007) for all the issues involved in aid effectiveness.
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on a selective basis or with conditions such as good policies and aid-effectiveness remains as
illusive as ever.
The above discussions suggest the need for innovations in the way aid is disbursed.
In this paper we propose one particular way of doing so, and this puts no conditionality on
the recipient.3 We develop a two-period model with two groups of people in the recipient
country. Aid is meant for one of the groups (the target group), but due to corruption a
proportion of aid may find its way to the non-target group. In our proposed design, aid is
given in period 2 but the amount of aid is dependent the level of wellbeing of the target
group in period 1. The recipient government can affect the wellbeing of the target group in
period 1 by the use of fiscal policy. In this sense, aid can be viewed as a prize to the recipient
government for reducing poverty through fiscal policy.4
We consider two scenarios. In the first, the donor and the recipient act simultaneously.
In the second scenario, the donor country can credibly commit on its aid policy in the sense
that it moves first in a sequential decision making.
The paper is organized in the following manner. The model is described in section
2. In section 3 the case of passive donor, the amount if aid is fixed, is analyzed. Section 4
discusses a situation where the donor is active. This section is divided into two subsections.
In subsection 4.1 decision-making by the donor and that by the recipient are simultaneous.
Sequential decision making where the donor acts as a leader is described in subsection 4.2.
Concluding remarks are presented in section 5.
3

Collier and Dollar (2002) propose an aid allocation rule that is likely to have significant impact on
poverty reduction under limited information on the part of the donors.
4
As Collier and Dollar (2004) note poverty reduction is the central goal of most aid programs.
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Aid as Prize: a Formal Model

In our model we consider two countries; the donor and the recipient. In the recipient country
there are two groups of people, rich and poor, labeled as r and p, respectively.5 The size of
r

p

population for the rich is same in both the periods, L and for poor it is, L1 in period 1 and
p

L2 in period 2.
The citizens of the donor country are altruistic and hence derive some utility by
helping the poor in the recipient country. At the beginning of period 1 the donor country
makes a promise to give aid in period 2, and the amount of aid is θup1 where (up1 ) is the utility
level of the poor in period 1, and θ is a policy parameter for the donor.
In period 1, the recipient government levies a lump-sum tax on the rich and transfers it
to the poor.6 In period 2, a proportion of foreign aid is transfered to the poor, the remaining
goes to the rich.
The production side of the recipient economy in the two periods are represented by
1

2

the revenue functions R1 (L , K) and R2 (L , K + I), where K is the capital stock in period
1 and I is the level of investment in period 1 which add to the capital stock in period 2.7
On the consumption side, the inter-temporal expenditure of a rich person is given
by the expenditure function E r (P1 , ρP2 , ur ) where ur is its inter-temporal utility level and
ρ = 1/(1 + i) where i is the exogenous interest rate at which a rich person can borrow as
much as it wants in period 1, and Pi (i = 1, 2) is the vector of prices in period i. We take the
recipient country to be a small open economy so that P1 and P2 are exogenously given. The
poor are assumed not be able to borrow at all. Each poor persons expenditure function in
5
This classification is for convenience only. There can be other classifications based on ethnicity or caste,
for example.
6
For simplicity we use this simple policy instrument. One can consider a more complicated way of
transferring income from the rich to the poor; for example through the provision of public good such as
health and education services.
7
Since prices do not vary in our analysis, for brevity, these are left out of the arguments of the revenue
function. See Dixit and Norman (1980) for properties of revenue function. It is well known that the partial
derivative of the revenue function with respect to the ith endowment gives the supply function for the ith
good.
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the two periods are given by E p1 (P1 , up1 ) and E p2 (P2 , up2 ) respectively where up2 is the utility
level of a poor person in period 2.8
Assuming, for simplicity, that the rental on capital accrues completely to the rich and
wage income goes exclusively to the poor, the income-expenditure balance equations in the
recipient country can be written as:
r

L E r (P1 , ρP2 , ur ) + I = KRk1 + ρ(K + I)Rk2 + ρ(1 − α)θup1 − T,
p1

p

p2

p

L E p1 (P1 , up1 ) = L1 RL1 + T,
L E p2 (P2 , up2 ) = L2 RL2 + αθup1 .
2
ρRK
= 1.

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

The left hand side of (1) is the total discounted expenditure (consumption and investment) by the rich. The first and the second terms on the right hand side of (1) are
respectively rental income from capital in period 1 and the discounted rental income in period 2. The third term is the discounted value of the part of foreign aid in period 2 that
is given to the rich, and finally last term is the lump-sum tax that is taken away from the
rich in period 1. Equations (2) and (3) are the income-expenditure balance equations for
the poor in periods 1 and 2 respectively. The first term is the factor (wage) income and the
second term is the transfer income. T is the lump-sum transfer from the rich to the poor in
period 1, and αθup1 is the proportion of aid in period 2 that is given to the poor. Equation
(4) represents the optimality of investment I. It is obtained by setting ∂ur /∂I = 0.
Having described the overall scenario above, we now discuss the behavior of the
recipient and the donor governments. In the following section, we shall assume that the
donor is passive in the sense that the parameter θ is exogenous. In section 4, we endogenize
this parameter by considering an active donor.
8
For properties of the expenditure function see Dixit and Norman (1980). It is well known that Eupi is
the reciprocal of the marginal utility of income for the poor in period i.
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Passive Donor

In this section we shall take θ to be exogenous and consider the recipient governments
decision making on the two instruments at its disposal, viz., the lump-sum tax T and the
allocation parameter α
The objective function of the recipient is:
r

p

p

max G = λL ur + L1 up1 + δ p L2 up2 ,
α,T

(5)

where λ > 1, is the extra weight placed on the welfare of the rich by the recipient government.
That is, the government cares for welfare of the rich more than that they do for the poor.
This is often called a political support function (see, for example, Van Long and Vousden
(1991)). This formulation can have many interpretations including a situation where the rich
lobbies the government with the help of campaign contributions a la Grossman and Helpman
(1994). δ p is the rate of time preference for the poor. This formulation of the government’s
objective function is somewhat similar to Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller (2004) who analyzed
the issue of fungibility of aid in a single-period model and how the donor government can
affect it.
In the above framework, when the recipient decides on the lump-sum tax, it is aware
of the penalties that the donor country can impose by lowering the amount of aid which
would adversely affect both the rich and the poor.
Before deriving the optimality conditions, it is useful to differentiate equations (1)-(3)
and using (4) write:
Lr Eur dur = −ρθup1 dα + ρ (1 − α) θdup1 + ρ (1 − α) up1 dθ − dT,

(6)

Lp1 Eup1 dup1 = dT,

(7)

Lp2 Eup2 dup2 = θup1 dα + αθdup1 + αup1 dθ.

(8)

5

Using equations (6)-(8), the first order condition for the optimizing problem of the
recipient government in (5) can be derived as:
λρθup1 δ p θup1
Gα = −
+ p2 = 0,
Eur
Eu


ρθ(1 − α)
1
δ p αθ
1
+ p1 + p p1 p2 = 0.
GT = λ − r + p p1
Eu
Eu
L1 Eu Eu
L1 Eu Eur

(9)
(10)

An increase in α for a given level of T , increases the utility of the poor in period 2.
This is the marginal benefit of increasing α. However, an increase in α reduces the income
of the rich in period 2 This is the marginal cost of increasing α. Equation (9) equates the
marginal benefits and marginal costs. Similarly, an increase in T reduces (increases) the
income of the rich (poor) in period 1 and increases the income of both the rich and and the
poor in period 2 by increasing the volume of aid. In equation (10) optimal T is determined
at a point where the marginal cost is equal to the marginal benefit of increasing T . Note
that whereas equation (9) gives a relationship between the marginal utilities of income of
the rich and that of the poor in period 2, equation (10) provides a relationship between the
marginal utilities of income of the rich and that of the poor in period 1.9
Having derived the optimality conditions, we shall now examine the effects of changes
in θ on optimal levels α and T . For this, we totally differentiate (9) and (10) to obtain:

9

dα
−Gαθ GT T + GT θ GαT
=
,
dθ
∆

(11)

Gαθ GT α − GT θ Gαα
dT
=
,
dθ
∆

(12)

The second order conditions, evaluated at the optimal levels of T and α, are:
2

Gαα = −

GT T = −

r
λρ2 (θup1 ) Euu
3

Lr (Eur )

2

−

p2
δ p (θup1 ) Euu

3 < 0,
Lp2 Eup2

r
p1
r
r
Euu
λEuu
ραθEuu
ραθup1 Euu
α2 Gαα
−
−

2


2 < 0,

2 −
2
2 + 
Lr Eur Eup1 λ Lp1 Eup1 Eur
Lr Eur Eup1 Lp1
Lr Eup1 Eur
Lp1 up1 Eup1

∆ = Gαα GT T − (GαT )2 > 0,
GT α =

r
ρθup1 Euu
−
2
Lr (Eur ) Eup1

where

r
λρ αθ2 up1 Euu
3
Lr (Eur ) Lp1 Eup1
2

−

−

p2
δ p αθ2 up1 Euu
< 0.

3
Lp2 Eup2 Lp1 Eup1
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where Gαα < 0, GT T < 0, and ∆ > 0 from the second order conditions, GαT < 0 (see
footnote 9), and

Gαθ =

p2
r
δ p αθ (up1 )2 Euu
λρ2 θ (up1 )2 (1 − α) Euu
−
,

3
Lr (Eur )3
Lp2 Eup2

GT θ =

r
r
p2
ρ (1 − α) up1 Euu
λρ
δ p αθup1 Euu
λρ2 θup1 α (1 − α) Euu
+
−
. (14)
+
3 p
p
p
L1 Eup1 Eur
Lr (Eur )2 Eup1
Lr (Eur )3 L1 Eup1
Lp2 Eup2 L1 Eup1

(13)

The signs of Gαθ and GT θ are in general ambiguous since an increase in θ has conflicting effects on the marginal benefits and marginal costs of α and T . For example, an increase
in θ, ceteris paribus, increases incomes of both the rich and the poor in the second period
by raising the volume of aid. This reduces the marginal utilities of income of both groups,
and thus reduces both the marginal cost and the marginal benefit of increasing α.
r
p1 p
p2 p
Defining η r = Euu
ur /Eur , η p1 = Euu
u1 /Eup1 and η p2 = Euu
u2 /Eup2 , and making the

reasonable assumption that the preferences of the poor are same in both the periods — i.e.,
η p1 = η p2 —, from equations (11) and (12) after substitutions we get
ρδ p θ2 (up1 )3 η r η p2
λ2 ρ3 (θup1 )2 η r
(δ p )2 (θup1 )2 η p2
=
+
> 0,
+
2
3
3 p p1
Lr Eur Lp2 Eup2 Eup1 up2 ur Lr (Eur ) L1 Eu ur Lp2 Eup2 Lp1 Eup1 up2


dα
λρup1 (η)2
αθup1
ρ−σ
λ2 ρ2 αθup1 η p1 η r
∆
= −
+
−
2
p p2 p
dθ
ρ
Lr (Eur )3 Lp1 Eup1 ur
Lr (Eur )2 Eup1 ur L2 Eu u2

dT
∆
dθ

−

λρ2 θup1 η r
λ2 ρ3 αθ2 up1 η r
λδ p αθup1 η p1 η p2
−
−
2
2
2
Lp2 Eup2 Eur Lp1 Eup1 up2 Lr (Eur )3 Lp1 Eup1 ur Lr (Eur )3 Lp1 Eup1 ur

−

λρδ p αθ2 up1 η r
< 0.
2
Lr (Eur )3 Lp1 Eup1 ur

where σ (= δ p Eup1 /Eup2 ) is the implicit discount factor — one over one plus the implict interest
rate — for the poor (see Djajić et al. (1999)). Since the interest rate faced by the poor is
likely to be much larger than that faced by the rich, we make the natural assumption that
σ ≤ ρ.
7

From the above two equation we find that
dα
dT
< 0,
> 0.
dθ
dθ
That is, an increase in θ increases the optimal level of T , but reduces that of α. Formally,

Proposition 1 A stronger linkage between the volume of aid in period 2 and the level of
welfare of the poor in period 1 leads to a higher transfer of income to the poor in period 1
and a bigger share of aid going to the poor in period 2.

Intuitively, a stronger linkage between the volume of aid in period 2 and the level of
welfare of the poor in period 1 acts as a carrot for the recipient government in period 1: it
raises the level of rich-to-poor transfer in order to receive a higher volume of aid in period 2.
However, having received a higher volume of aid, it then compensates the rich for extracting
from it a higher level of transfer in period 1 by giving the latter a higher proportion of the
aid received. We now analyze how an increase in θ affects the welfare of the poor.
An increase in θ, by increasing the amount of rich-to-poor transfer T in period 1,
unambiguously increases the welfare of the poor in period 1. However, it has conflicting
effect on the welfare of the poor in period 2. First, since the total amount of aid θup1
increases with θ, the income of the poor in period 2 increases for a given value of α. But
since α decreases with θ, an increase in θ reduces the income of the poor in period 2, for a
given level of aid. Combining these two conflicting effects, we find that
 p1

r
λ (ρθup1 )2 Euu
ση
d (αθup1 )
=
−1
∆
2 ·
dθ
ρ
Lr (Eur )2 Lp1 Eup1
That is,

(15)

d (αθup1 )
ρ
> 0 ⇐⇒ η p1 >
dθ
σ
p

The effect on total inter-temporal welfare of the poor, W p which is equal to L1 up1 +

8

p

δ p L2 up2 , can be derived as
ρδ p (1 − α) θup1 η r η p2
∆
dW p
λρδ p θη p2
=
·
+


2
2
2
θ (up1 )2 dθ
Lr Eur Lp2 Eup2
Eup1 up2 ur Lp2 Eup2 Lp1 Eup1 Eur up2

(16)

ρδ p θup1 η r η p2
λ2 ρ3 δ p θη p1 η r
λρδ p θη p1 η r
+
+
+
> 0.


2
2
2
Lr (Eur )3 Lp1 Eup1 Eup2 ur Lr Eur Lp2 Eup1 Eup2 up2 ur Lr (Eur )3 Lp1 Eup1 Eup2 ur
That is, an increase in θ unambiguously increases the inter-temporal utility of the poor.
Formally,
Proposition 2 A stronger linkage between the volume of aid in period 2 and the level of
welfare of the poor in period 1 unambiguously increases period-1 utility and inter-temporal
utility of the poor. It also increases period-2 utility of the poor if and only if ση p1 > ρ.
The possibility that an increase in θ can in fact increase period-two utility is an
interesting one, as in our two-period model, the recipient government has no direct incentive
to be particularly kind to the poor in period 2. This happens partly via an increase in the
total amount of aid. Note that when σ is sufficiently high or, in other words, the implicit
interest rate for the poor is sufficiently low, the poor’s welfare in period 2 will in fact increase
with θ. This is because a lower value of the interest in some sense would allow the poor to
effectively transfer some of the benefits from period 1 to period 2.

4

Active Donor

In this section we endogenize the parameter θ by assuming that the donor government chooses
it optimally. We consider two situations based on the timing of the decision making process
of the donor and the recipient. In the first case we will consider the case of simultaneous
decision making, i.e., where both the governments act at the same time. This is done in
subsection 4.1. In subsection 4.2, we will analyze a sequential decision making game where
the donor moves first and recipient acts as a follower. Later, the two equilibria will be
compared.
9

4.1

Simultaneous Decisions

The donor and the recipient move at the same time taking each ones actions as given, i.e.
the recipient chooses α and T considering θ as a constant and donor chooses θ taking α and
T as given.
The optimality conditions for the recipient country are the same as in (9) and (10).
As for the donor country, it maximizes the following objective function:
max U
θ

D


=V

θup1
Y −
1+γ



 p
p 
+ β L1 up1 + δ p L2 up2 ,

(17)

where V (.) is the indirect utility function (with V 0 > 0 and V 00 < 0), γ is the discount rate in
the donor country, β is the altruism parameter, and the expression inside the square brackets
is the total discounted welfare of the poor people in the recipient country.
The first order condition for θ is:
UθD = −

up1 V 0
βδ p αup1
+
= 0,
(1 + γ)
Eup2

which can be simplified as
βδ p α
V0
.
=
(1 + γ)
Eup2

(18)

An increase in θ increases aid and therefore reduces income in the donor country. This
is the marginal cost of increasing θ, and is given by the right hand side of (18). However,
providing aid increases welfare of the poor in the recipient country this increases the utility
of the donor country via the altruism factor. This effect is captured by the left hand side of
(18).
Equations (9), (10) and (18) simultaneously determine the optimal values of α, T and
θ. Having described the simultaneous game, we shall now carry out a few comparative static
exercises. For simplicity, for these exercises we shall first treat T as exogenous so that we

10

shall only consider equations (9) and (18). Having done this, we shall then consider T to be
endogenous and α as exogenous, focusing on equations (10) and (18).
Case 1: Exogenous T
We start by considering a comparative static effect of the corruption parameter λ.
Totally differentiating (9) and (18) we obtain the following results:

D
(Gαλ ) Uθθ
dα
< 0,
=−
D
D
dλ
(Gαα Uθθ
− Gαθ Uθα
)

D
(Gαλ ) Uθα
dθ
,
=
D
D
dλ
)
− Gαθ Uθα
(Gαα Uθθ
where
Gαλ

ρθup1
= − r < 0,
Eu

D
Uθα



βδ p up1
αθup1 η p2
=
1 − p p2 p .
Eup2
L2 Eu u2

Note that the second order condition for the donor’s optimization problem requires that

D
D
D
Uθθ
< 0, and the stability of the Nash equilibrium implies Gαα Uθθ
− Gαθ Uθα
> 0.
It follows from the above that an increase λ unambiguously reduces the allocation
of aid to the poor. This is because an increase in the corruption parameter increases the
marginal cost of increasing α (the first term in (9)). The effect of an increase in λ on θ
is however ambiguous. This is because an increase in λ on one hand reduces the marginal
benefit of increasing θ by reducing α. On the other hand, the induced reduction in α reduces
the second-period income of the poor and thus increases the marginal utility of income in
that period. This increases the marginal benefit of increasing θ. The net effect on θ is
therefore ambiguous. However, noting that αθup1 /(Lp2 Eup2 up2 ) is less than the share of aid in
period 2 income of the poor, when the magnitude of η p2 is less than unity then an increase
in λ will decrease θ.

Proposition 3 When the donor and the recipient countries move simultaneously, an increase in corruption in the recipient country, unambiguously reduces the proportion of aid
going to the poor. In such a situation, the donor will reduce θ provided η p2 is not very large.
11

Turning to the comparative static effects of the altruism parameter,β, and the income
level Y in the donor country, we find:

D
− (Gαα ) Uθβ
dθ
dα
(Uθβ ) (Gαθ )
,
> 0,
=
=
D
D
D
D
dβ
) dβ
)
− Gαθ Uθα
− Gαθ Uθα
(Gαα Uθθ
(Gαα Uθθ
dα
dθ
(UθY ) (Gαθ )
− (UθY ) (Gαα )
,
> 0,
=
=
D
D
D
D
dY
)
− Gαθ Uθα
(Gαα Uθθ − Gαθ Uθα ) dY
(Gαα Uθθ
where
Gαθ =

r
p2
λρ2 θ (up1 )2 (1 − α) Euu
δ p αθ (up1 )2 Euu
−
3 ,
Lr (Eur )3
Lp2 Eup2

Uθβ =

δ p αup1
> 0,
(1 + γ)

UθY = −

V 00 up1
> 0.
(1 + γ)

An increase in income in the donor country reduces the marginal cost of increasing
θ (and thus increasing aid) by reducing the marginal utility of income there (see (18). This
increases the optimal value of θ. An increase in β also increases the optimal value of θ
by increasing the marginal benefit of increasing θ. This increase in the optimal value of θ
(because of an increase in either Y or β) has two opposite effects on the optimal level of α.
First, it reduces the marginal utility of the rich and therefore the marginal cost of increasing
α. Second, it also reduces the marginal utility of the poor in period 2 and therefore the
marginal benefit of increasing α. If the poor have very low time preferences, i.e. δ p is very
low then the first effect will dominate and the optimal value of α will increase with both Y
and β. Formally,

Proposition 4 Suppose that the donor and the recipient country move simultaneously. Then
an increase in altruism or income in the donor country unambiguously induces the donor
government to impose a stronger relationship between the volume of aid and the wellbeing of
the poor in period 1. This induced stronger relationship increases the optimal value of the
proportion of aid going to the poor if the time preference of the poor is sufficiently low.

12

Case 2: Exogenous α
Now we will consider α to be exogenous and examine comparative static effects on T
and θ. Totally differentiating (10)) and (18) we get:

D
− (GT λ ) Uθθ
dT
< 0,
=−
D
D
dλ
(GT T Uθθ
− GT θ UθT
)

D
(GT λ ) UθT
dθ
> 0,
=
D
D
dλ
)
− GT θ UθT
(GT T Uθθ
where
ρθ (1 − α)
1
+ p p1
< 0,
(because of (10)),
r
Eu
L1 Eu Eur
"
#
p2
βδ p α2 Euu
θup1
V 00
−
= p p1
 < 0.
L1 Eu (1 + γ)2 Lp2 Eup2 3

GT λ = −

D
UθT


D
D
Note that from the stability of Nash equilibrium we must have GT T Uθθ
− GT θ UθT
> 0.
An increase in corruption in the recipient country will increase the marginal cost of
increasing T , and thus the optimal value of T will fall. However, in this case the effect of
an increase in λ on θ is unambiguously positive. An increase in corruption, by reducing
T , lowers the volume of aid. This increases the marginal utility of income for the poor in
period 2 (which in turn increases the marginal benefit of increasing θ), but it also reduces
the marginal utility of income in the donor country (which in turn reduces the marginal cost
of increasing θ). These two effects reinforce each other and the optimal value of θ increases
with λ. This result is formally stated in the following proposition.

Proposition 5 When donor and recipient move simultaneously, then an increase in corruption in the recipient country will reduce the level of rich-to-poor transfer in period 1 and
donor will strengthen link between aid and the wellbeing of the poor in period 1.

As for the comparative static effects of the donor’s income and the altruism parameter

13

on T and θ, we get:

D
− (GT T ) Uθβ
dθ
dT
(Uθβ ) (GT θ )
,
> 0,
=
=
D
D
D
D
dβ
) dβ
)
− GT θ UθT
− GT θ UθT
(GT T Uθθ
(GT T Uθθ
dT
(UθY ) (GT θ )
dθ
− (UθY ) (GT T )
=
,
=
> 0,
D
D
D
D
dY
)
(GT T Uθθ − GT θ UθT ) dY
(GT T Uθθ
− GT θ UθT
where
GT θ =

r
r
p2
λρ2 θup1 α (1 − α) Euu
ρup1 (1 − α) Euu
λρ
δ p α2 θup1 Euu
+
+
−
,
3
Lp1 Eup1 Eur
Lr (Eur )2 Eup1
Lr (Eur )3 Lp1 Eup1
Lp2 Eup2 Lp1 Eup1

Uθβ =

δ p αup1
> 0,
(1 + γ)

UθY = −

V 00 up1
> 0.
(1 + γ)

Any increase in the altruism parameter (or, income in the donor country) will increase
the marginal benefit of increasing θ ((or, reduce the marginal cost of increasing θ by reducing
the marginal utility of income in the donor country). Thus the effects on θ are unambiguously
positive. This induced increase in the value of θ has conflicting effects on the marginal effects
of T . However, if the rate of time preference for the poor is sufficiently low, the optimal level
of T will increase. Formally,

Proposition 6 If the donor and recipient move simultaneously then an increase in the altruism parameter or the income of the donor will increase θ. This will induce the recipient
to increase T if the the time preference of the poor is not very high.

4.2

Sequential Decisions

Having analyzed the case where both countries act simultaneously, in this section we shall
examine if credible commitment on the part of the donor country can influence the equilibrium my inducing the recipient government to follow a more pro-poor policy. To be more
specific, in this section we assume that the donor country acts as a leader and the recipient
country as the follower. In order to achieve a sub-game perfect equilibrium, we work with
backward induction, starting with stage two of the game. In stage two of the game, the
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recipient country optimally chooses the values of α and T for a given value of θ. The recipient’s reaction functions α(θ) and T (θ) are derived from (9) and (10). Hence in the stage I of
the game the donor country optimally chooses its instruments by taking into consideration
the recipient’s reaction functions, α(θ) and T (θ). In the first stage of the game the donor
government optimally chooses its instruments by taking into consideration the recipient’s
reaction functions, α(θ) and T (θ). That is, the donor government maximizes (17) subject to
(9) and (10) (the recipient’s reaction functions).
The first order condition for θ in the sequential game is:
dU D
V 0 up1
βδ p αup1
βδ p θup1 dα
β dT
D
≡ Uf
=
−
+
+
+
θ
dθ
1+γ
Eup2
Eup1 dθ
Eup2 dθ

(19)

The last two terms were absent in the simultaneous game and appear here because of
the sequential nature of the present game. From Proposition 1, dT /dθ > 0 and dα/dθ < 0.
Hence, since the sum of the first two terms on the right hand side of (19) is zero when it is
evaluated at the simultaneous equilibrium, using (18) we obtain from (19):
D
Uf
θ

=
θ=θsim

β dT
βδ p θup1 dα
+
,
Eup1 dθ
Eup2 dθ

(20)

where θsim is the equilibrium value of θ in the simultaneous game. If the time preference
of the poor is sufficiently low, then the positive effect of T will dominate and θseq > θsim
where θseq is the equilibrium value of θ in the sequential game. A higher θ in the sequential
game also implies a higher value of T and lower value of α in that game (compared to the
simultaneous game). However, this will mean a higher welfare for the poor and the donor
country. This result is formally stated in the following proposition.

Proposition 7 The welfare of the poor and the donor will higher in a sequential game
where the donor moves first as compared to a simultaneous game, provided the the rate of
time preference for the poor is sufficiently low.
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By committing credibly to a stronger relationship between aid in period 2 and good
governance in period 1 (in the sense of a better pro-poor policy in period 1), the donor
country is able to induce the recipient country to follow a more pro-poor policy as compared
to the situation where prior commitment is not possible.

5

Conclusion

Foreign aid is often given for the benefit of the poor in a recipient country. However, more
often than not, a significant proportion of this aid is diverted away from the target group.
In the literature this is known as fungibility of foreign aid. Fungibility is often blamed for
the ineffectiveness of aid which in turn causes aid fatigue among donors.
In this paper we have tried to develop a method of disbursement of aid that would
induce recipient countries to follow, without any conditionality on the use of aid, a more
pro-poor policies than they would otherwise do. Our method would also imply a higher flow
of aid than there would be in its absence.
The method involves linking the volume of aid in a period to the wellbeing of the
target group in the previous period. The recipient country is assumed to maximize its
political support function (which attached a higher weight to the welfare of the non-target
group than to that of the target group) by optimally choosing a level of transfer from the
rich to the poor in the first period and the allocation aid between the two groups in the
second period.
We analyze the donor’s and the recipient’s behavior under three scenarios : (1) the
donor is passive in the sense that its policy instrument (the link between aid and pro-poor
policy) is treated as exogenous, (2) the donor is active and chooses it policy at the same as
the recipient government chooses its instruments, (3) the donor behaves as a leader.
When the donor is passive, an increase in the aid determining parameter of the donor,
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or the link between aid in the second period and good governance (a more pro-poor policy)
in the first period, raises the level of transfer from the rich to the poor, but lowers the poor’s
share in aid. However, the total welfare of the poor increases.
When the donor is active and chooses the aid determining parameter simultaneously
as the recipient government chooses its instruments, the deterioration of governance in the
recipient country in the sense of a higher weight for the non-target group in the recipient
country’s objective function, leads to lower proportion of aid going to the poor and lower
transfer from the rich to the poor. However, an increase in either altruism or income in the
donor country increases the aid determining parameter.
We compare the equilibrium between the cases when the two countries act simultaneously and when the donor acts before the recipient country in a sequential-move game. We
find that the volume of aid is higher and the recipient government follows a more pro-poor
policy in the sequential game as compared to the simultaneous game, provided the rate of
time preference for the poor is sufficiently low.
Our simple theoretical study points out that the mode of disbursement of aid in a
dynamic context can be a move forward for the benefit of all the parties concerned.
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